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My statement in the Winter 2002 issue (pp. 5-6), that
Connecticut’s impending budget pains “pale[d] by com-
parison with the woes of some other states,” turns out
to have been wide of the mark.  What spoiled my aim,
and that of most other observers at the time, was of
course the recession, but also how hard this slump has
hit state revenues.  Connecticut has plenty of company:
with only a few exceptions, state tax revenues across
the country have plummeted by unprecedented
amounts, auguring a difficult next few years for state
finances.  Why were we caught unawares, and what do
we do about it now?
The origins of the states’ acute pain are in the once-
vaunted “New Economy”—not its much-heralded,
Internet-borne miracles, but rather the accompanying
gusher of realized capital gains and stock options dur-
ing the Bubble Years of the late 1990s.  Data from
Economy.com indicate that, nationwide, cash raised
by households from capital gains and options soared
five-fold over the five years 1996-2000—from just over
$200 million to about $1 trillion—but has now col-
lapsed to the starting level in a mere two years as the
bubble burst.  One consequence is that income-tax
receipts have fallen farther and farther behind initial
projections.  And (as the graph shows) states like
Connecticut, California, Massachusetts, New Jersey
and New York, whose residents received especially
large shares of their incomes from this source, took
especially large revenue hits.
Connecticut’s elected officials dutifully tried to stay
atop the growing snowball: draining reserves and tap-
ping one-shot sources, cutting spending, and raising
tobacco taxes.  But by late September 2002, Governor
Rowland informed the leaders of the Appropriations
Committee in the legislature that he had exhausted the
possible spending cuts he could make without further
legislation.  By then, the State Office of Policy and
Management (OPM) was projecting a FY 2003 deficit
of $330.2 million—2.7% of net General Fund appropri-
ations—with probable add-ons that would bring the
figure to some $360 million.  On October 1, 2002,
State Comptroller Nancy Wyman informed the
Governor that her own deficit projection was $390
million, or 3.1% of net appropriations.  
Either deficit figure would be on top of the $222.4
million deficit from FY 2002, which the State financed
by issuing “Economic Recovery Notes”; borrowing by
any other name is still an increase in state debt.  And
we got the ’02 deficit that low by using up all of the
Rainy Day Fund ($595 million) and selling $125 mil-
lion in Anthem-Blue Cross shares from the “demutual-
ization” fund.
The forenamed projections are almost certainly best-
case estimates.  Worse, recent macroeconomic fore-
casts from Economy.com (for the US) and the New
England Economic Project (whose own forecasts are
driven by Economy.com’s) indicate that the mild
recovery from the pallid recession may have stalled
out.
Misery Loves Irony
Last time, in the Great Recession of 1989-1992,
Connecticut resorted to major structural tax reform—
adoption of a broad-based State income tax under
then-Governor Weicker’s leadership.  This time
around, our budget crisis arose because of our depen-
dence on the swelling stream of revenues from the
income tax.  Arguably, the pain would have been less,
had we made do in the early 1990s with the Old-
Economy sales tax—but that would have meant
reduced levels of state services.  More important,
though, no foreseeable “structural reform” will make
the Governor’s and legislature’s budgetary labors any
easier in the New Year.  
Face it.  The solution of Connecticut’s fiscal prob-
lems, well into FY 2004 at least, lies somewhere with-
in the Iron Triangle of tax increases, budget cuts, and
more borrowing.  The process will of necessity, and
rightly, be quintessentially political.  In that sense, my
task ends here.  But as an economist, I do have some-
thing to say on the relative merits of the three options.
Tax Increases: To put much of a dent in the loom-
ing deficits by this route will mean looking to the per-
sonal income and sales taxes.
The easiest target for raising big revenues is obvi-
ously the state income tax.  We have seen a steady
stream of incremental tax cuts since 1996, in the form
of a lower initial rate, tax credits and bracket expan-
sions targeted at those with low-to-middle incomes.
Most of the revenues now come from the high end of
the income distribution (71% from the top 15% in
1998).  To get significant blood out of this stone
would probably require temporary suspension, or even
roll-backs, of the credits and bracket changes, and a
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surcharge (ideally, temporary) on upper-income
taxpayers.  The risk is that the well-off are also the
most mobile taxpayers, though likely tax hikes in
neighboring states would provide some cover for
Connecticut to raise taxes at the upper end.
Until and unless our three neighbors (NY, MA
and RI) raise their sales taxes (and they’re doubt-
less waiting for us to move first), legislators
(backed by merchants near the borders) may be
loath to look in this direction for added revenues.
Raising the sales tax from 6 to 7 percent would
raise an extra $560 million per year, provided peo-
ple viewed it as permanent; a short-term, stop-gap
increase would raise less now if Nutmeggers
deferred large purchases till it expired.
Budget Cuts: Elsewhere in this issue (pp. 4-5),
Dennis Heffley shows that the Nutmeg State was
already lean and mean in its spending ways before
the current budget crisis struck.  Hence, in making
spending cuts it’s important to avoid damaging
long-term goals and the means of achieving them.
For instance, Connecticut (along with California
and Massachusetts) has built its economy on an
educated work force.  Thus, cuts in education at
any or all levels would constitute at least a tempo-
rary departure from long-term policy.
Indirect cuts in educational spending could come
in the form of reduced state aid to municipalities.
The one segment of public revenues not discussed
so far, property taxes, is collected by cities and
towns.  With real estate values continuing to grow
right through the recession, local governments’ tax
capacity has also grown.  (The Connecticut Policy
and Economic Council, or CPEC, reports that per
capita property values rose by 11.7%, statewide,
over the decade 1991-2001).  It may be tempting,
therefore, for State policy makers to shift some of
the burden of the State’s deficit onto localities by
cutting aid payments to them.  If this is done, it
will be wise to (a) do it soon and (b) provide a cir-
cuit-breaker that restores some or all of the aid, if
(as gloomier prognosticators are warning) the cur-
rent signs of price softness for the priciest proper-
ties, along with weakness in commercial real estate,
portend another swoon in real estate values—and
with it, a plunge in local-government revenues. 
Infrastructure projects funded out of the
Transportation Fund are not a problem, because the
money comes from motor fuel taxes that are ear-
marked for highways and other transportation uses.
This Fund actually ran a surplus of about $190 mil-
lion in FY 2002 and is expected to do the same
again this year.  Of course, the General Assembly
could reduce gasoline taxes as a way of mitigating
increases in other taxes.
More Borrowing: Connecticut already has
among the highest rates of state debt per capita,
though (as Dennis Heffley’s piece in this issue
points out) we don’t look quite so bad after con-
trolling for our high average income.  One con-
straint on adding to state debt is how rating agen-
cies like Moody’s view the ability of the state to
reap tax revenues in the future to “service” the
debt.  With Connecticut having just financed a FY
2002 deficit of nearly a quarter-billion dollars, fur-
ther borrowing will raise eyebrows among bond
raters.  Still, with most other states struggling to
cope with deficits, Connecticut may not look all
that much worse if it borrows more.  But policy
makers should recognize that a lower bond rating
will likely raise the interest rates that the state has
to pay, making it more costly to manage the exist-
ing debt as it matures and needs to be refinanced.
Some states have already sought to stave off
growing deficits by “securitizing” their time streams
of payments from tobacco companies under the
gang settlement of November 1998.  Connecticut
could do so, too, and several other states are con-
sidering it.  Why discuss this topic under the head-
ing of “borrowing”?  Because that is what in effect
a state does by earmarking and alienating its yearly
tobacco-settlement revenues in exchange for a pile
of money now.  There is little difference between
issuing general-obligation bonds against future total
revenues-cum-tobacco-dollars, and separately
“securitizing” those dollars but then having to live
with reduced revenues-sans-tobacco-dollars.
Lessons?
What lessons may we take away from the bud-
getary surprise of 2002?  For starters, be even more
vigilant about controlling spending growth, and
retain the knowledge, learned the hard way, that
income tax revenues can fall as sharply as they
may rise.
What about stashing cash away in the Rainy Day
Fund (RDF)?  With hindsight, it is easy to argue
that we should have used the surpluses of the late
1990s to build up the RDF beyond the statutory
requirement of 5% of appropriations authorized—
say, to 10%, as Comptroller Nancy Wyman and
others have advocated.  To a considerable extent,
though, socking away more in the RDF would have
simply substituted for the ad hoc measures taken to
avoid committing the surpluses in new spending
programs (e.g., financing capital projects out of the
surpluses).  Perhaps requiring a 10% RDF by law
would focus the minds of State politicians on
remaining vigilant against plunging revenues more
than ad hoc measures would.  But even a 10% RDF
would not have covered the multiyear deficits the
State is now suffering.  Do I hear 15%?
In important part, the lessons to be drawn on the
revenue side depend on whether income tax rev-
enues are likely to behave similarly in future reces-
sions.  If (as many observers aver) those revenues
were the product of a true bubble in the second
half of the 1990s, future income tax revenues
should be less…well, exciting (on the up as well as
the down side)—at least until a future generation of
state politicians forgets what happened during the
Bubble Years.  Based on 40+years of watching and
trying to understand public policy, I’d say that’ll
take about a decade.